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MUGWUMP, MEDIATOR, MACHIAVELLIAN,
OR MAJORITY?
THE ROLE OF JUSTICE O'CONNOR
IN THE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
by
THOMAS R. HAGGARD*
I am sure that these questions [involving affirmative action] ... are
going to come back before the Court in a variety offorms. I do believe
that litigation in the area of affirmative action isfarfrom resolved, as
I see it, and that we will continue to have cases in this area.
Sandra Day O'Connor
Nomination Hearings
September 9, 1981'
It was a prophetic statement from the nominee. Since Justice O'Connor's
appointment in 1981, affirmative action has been back before the Court on ten oc-
casions.2 The cases have generated forty separate opinions and fill over 450 pages
of the reporters. Yet, the matter is far from resolved, from either a statutory or a
* David W. Robinson, Chair, Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.A., University
of Texas, 1964; LL.B., University of Texas School of Law, 1967.
I Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 97th Congress, I st Sess. 84 (1981), reprinted in THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS
AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1981: 1983 Supplement 196 (compiled by R. Mersky & J. Jacobstein 1983)
[hereinafter Hearings].
The prior affirmative action cases that she had reference to were: DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312 (1974); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1977); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979); and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In addition, the philosophical and
constitutional progenitors of affirmative action had been established in the school desegregation cases, Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971). See generally, L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE
SCHOOLS (1976).
2 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S.Ct. 2997 (1990); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal.,
480 U.S. 616 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters
v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
56i (i984); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 7i8 (i982) (not generaly regarded as an
"affirmative action" case).
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constitutional perspective.
As the beneficiary of a form of affirmative action herself,3 Justice O'Connor
was naturally expected to play a significant role in this particular controversy.4 She
3 President Reagan openly admitted that her appointment was in fulfillment of his election campaign promise
"that one of my first appointments to the Supreme Court vacancy would be the most qualified woman that
I could possibly find." Presidential Statements Relating to the Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor to the
Supreme Court of the United States, HEARINGS at 6. See also Id. at 9, 11; Congressional Record Citations
to Sandra Day O'Connor's Nomination Including Roll Call Vote, Id. at 28. Although this was clearly a
"mixed motive" type of decision, based on both sex and qualifications, the President's admission would
certainly satisfy Justice Brennan's understanding of the "because of... sex" requirement of Title VII, in
that President Reagan clearly "relied on sex-based considerations in coming to [his] decision." Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1786 (1989). And it is unlikely that President Reagan could have
satisfied what Justice Brennan has called an affirmative defense, namely that he "would have made the same
decision even if [he] had not taken [Justice O'Connor's] gender into account." Id. at 1795. In sum, this proof/
lack-of-proof combination would demonstrate that "but for" her sex, Sandra Day O'Connor would not have
been nominated and appointed to the Supreme Court, thus also satisfying now Justice O'Connor's own tests
for causation and liability under Title VII. Id. at 1797. This is merely to say, of course, that her qualifications
and her sex were both necessary conditions of her appointment, not that her sex alone was a sufficient
condition (or the sole cause) of her appointment.
On the role of Justice O'Connor's gender in her selection and performance as a Supreme Court
Justice, see generally, Slotnick, Gender, Affirmative Action, and Recruitment to the Federal Bench, 14
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 519 (1984); Cook, Women As Supreme Court Candidates: From Florence Allen to
Sandra O'Connor, 65 JUDICATURE 314 (1982).
4 See Kelso, Justice O'Connor Replaces Justice Stewart: What Effect on Constitutional Cases?, 13 PAC. L.J.
259,270 (1982) (noting that Justice Stewart generally adhered to the "colorblind" theory of equal protection,
the author concludes that "[h]ow Justice O'Connor approaches that question may make a real difference in
whether the Court approves state or federal programs of affirmative action").
At the time of her confirmation, however, it was difficult to predict what her position on affirmative
action would be. As an Arizona legislator and state-court judge, Justice O'Connor had not been directly
confronted with any true affirmative action issues, the closest being a busing proposal which she voted
against. Congressional Record Citations, HEARINGS at 46. She had not written on the topic of affirmative
action. And during her confirmation Hearings she declined to express any concrete opinions about
affirmative action, on the theory that this was a likely matter to come before the Court. Hearings Before the
Senate Committee, HEARINGs at 196. What she did say was thus limited to general restatements about what
the Court had done in the past. Id. at 190 (recognizes affirmative remedial orders as a way of vindicating
constitutional rights); id. at 196 (discussion of the "colorblind" theory); id. at 232 (identification of the
various standards of review); id. at 260-61 (cryptic discussion of the disparate impact theory of discrimination
as a form of affirmative action); id. at 274 (oblique reference to Bakke in the context of a discussion Supreme
Court acceptance of cases for review). Thus, there was nothing specific in her record on which to base any
predictions about how she might vote.
The evidence from which inferences might be drawn would have led to mixed conclusions. As a
woman in a male-dominated profession, she might have been expected to be sensitive to the claimed
justifications for affirmative action. But her reputation as a Reagan-style political conservative would have
tended to negate that possibility. On the other hand, as a judicial conservative she could be expected to both
defer to the judgment of legislatures and construe legislation according to its "plain meaning." The former
would produce an inclination to uphold governmental affirmative action plans, while the latter would require
their invalidation where the statute, like Title VII, contains an unequivocal statutory prohibition against race
and sex discrimination. Yet, again because of her purported judicial conservativism, it might have seemed
likely that an adherence to stare decisis would restrain her from leading any major retreat from the Court's
prior decisions. Although she was regarded as a strict constructionist, it is problematic what that means in
the context of the equal protection clause and affirmative action. Finally, Justice O'Connor's reputation as
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has not disappointed the Court watchers in this regard. She has written a separate
opinion in nine out of the ten cases -- consisting of two majority opinions, four
concurring opinions, two dissenting opinion, and one opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Justice O'Connor's record and outpourings of opinion are,
however, subject to several different interpretations.
First, since she did not consistently align herself with either the "conserva-
tive" or the "liberal" wings of the Court on the affirmative action issue,5 for a time
some people regarded Justice O'Connor as an intellectual "mugwump," 6 one who
refused to come down on either side of a clear ideological and constitutional fence.
Second, Justice O'Connor's early ambivalence was also explained as simply
an attempt to forge a consensus. By eschewing the "extreme" positions and
emphasizing the points of agreement among the members of the Court, some
suggested that she was staking out a middle ground on which she hoped most the
Court will ultimately agree. They thus saw her as an aspiring "mediator" between
the conflicting factions on the Court.
Third, as time passed, some critics began to find a certain amount of
disingenuity in Justice O'Connor's approach to affirmative action. Though she
continued to give "lip service" to the idea of compensatory reverse discrimination,
they discovered that she was actually willing to recognize its legitimacy in only the
narrowest of circumstances. They regarded this as a devious and "Machiavellian"
way of doing what the conservative wing was doing more openly.
The purpose of this article is to provide a critical analysis of Justice O'Con-
nor's affirmative action opinions. It will show that while her early record provides
justification for all three characterizations, her more recent decisions suggest the
emergency of a more favorable image. Her opinions in Croson and Media
Broadcasting reflect the realization that a narrow, hair-splitting approach to this
critical social and constitutional crisis will do little to hasten its resolution; that there
a non-ideological pragmatist might have suggested that she would follow an evolutionary, case-by-case
approach to the problem, thus avoiding either of the two philosophical extremes. In a way, all of these
predictions have proven true, and herein lies the enigma of Justice O'Connor position on affirmative action.
I Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, who have voted in favor of affirmative action in every major
case, form the core of the so-called "liberal" branch of the Court. Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, who are
equally consistent in their opposition to affirmative action, represent the so-called "conservative" branch.
The partial role reversals which occurred in Mississippi University For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982), discussed infra notes 7-18 and accompanying text, merely underscore the fact that this was not truly
an "affirmative action" case, although I have included it in the analysis. Justices White, Powell, and Stevens,
and former Chief Justice Burger have been somewhat idiosyncratic and unpredictable in their approach to
affirmative action. See generally, Daly, Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors -- Keeping Score in the
7, V.. , 3'U B..L. Kev. 1, 4*-81U (1988).
6 "Mugwump .... now gen. used in a pej. manner, to insinuate that he is, to repeat the President of Princeton's
definition, 'a man with his mug on one side of the fence and his wump on the other."' E. PARTRIDGE, A
DICnONARY OF SLANG AND UNCONVENTIONAL ENGLISH (P. Beal 8th ed. 1984). Most people predict that Justice
Souter, who has replaced Justice Brennan, will join the "conservative" camp on affirmative action.
Summer, 19901
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is apparently no form of affirmative action that the liberal wing of the Court is
unwilling to endorse, making her consensus by compromise approach a futile dream;
and that, thus, there is no further reason to mask her true commitment to the principle
of non-discrimination.
The article will further show that her opinions reflect certain analytical models
and philosophical premises on which a coherent affirmative action jurisprudence can
be based; that when fully worked out and articulated, these models and premises
mandate a forthright repudiation of everything except the truly remedial forms of
affirmative action; that this is the position she will ultimately take; and that around
her will eventually form a new and consistent majority on the affirmative action
issue.
Mississippi University For Women v. Hogan:7
THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASE THAT WASN'T
This was Justice O'Connor's first opinion for the Court. It involved a state
nursing school which discriminated in favor of women admittees, a policy which it
said merely constituted "educational affirmative action." 8 An otherwise qualified
male applicant to the school, who had been denied admission solely on the basis of
his sex, claimed that the policy violated the equal protection clause.
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court agreed.9 Justice O'Connor wrote
the majority opinion, stating that: "In limited circumstances, a gender-based
classification favoring one sex [e.g., "affirmative action"] can be justified if it
intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately
burdened."l0 She then concluded that the policy could not be justified on those
terms.
First, Justice O'Connor noted the absence of any disproportionate burden, or
what she later referred to as "discriminatory barriers"'" against the entrance of
7458 U.S. 718 (1982). See generally, Comment, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: Token or Triumph From
a Feminist Perspective, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 493, 511-15 (1985).
8 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727. The only time Justice O'Connor even used the term "affirmative action" was in
connection with this claim by the school itself. In her mind the school was clearly engaged in something
altogether different.
'For an "affirmative action" case, Hogan produced an unusual alignment of the Justices. Justices Brennan
and Marshall, from the pro-affirmative action wing of the Court, viewed this as impermissible discrimination.
Justice Blackmun, the other member of the "liberal" troika, broke ranks on this case, but Justices Stevens
and White went along, thus forming the majority. Justice Rehnquist, known for his consistent opposition to
affirmative action, would have upheld the school's discrimination against the male applicant. He was joined
by the generally "conservative" Chief Justice Burger, by Justice Powell, and by the usually "liberal" Justice
Blackmun. The explanation for this apparent line-crossing is, of course, that Hogan was an "affirmative
action" case in name only.
10 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728 (emphasis added).
1Id. at 729.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/4
MUGWUMP, MEDIATOR, MACHIAVELLIAN, OR MAJORITY?
women into the nursing profession. This, she said, was evidenced by statistics
showing a high preponderance of women earning nursing degrees and holding jobs
as nurses in both Mississippi and the rest of the country.' 2 This threshold require-
ment, that of showing the existence of prior discrimination by reference to a
statistical imbalance, will later become the centerpiece of Justice O'Connor's
affirmative action theory.
The second element that the affirmative action plan lacked in this case was that
of providing "assistance." That is, rather than benefiting female nurses, she
concluded that the state's discriminatory admissions policy actually constituted a
wrong not only against men, but also against women. Justice O'Connor's explana-
tion of this is somewhat unclear. What she said was that the admissions policy
"tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's
job,"' 13 and thus "lends credibility to the old view that women, not men should
become nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is a field for women a self-
fulfilling prophecy." 
This could be taken in several ways. First, there is a suggestion in a footnote
that the absence of men in the profession tends to depress wages,'I thus constituting
a tangible injury to women nurses. Second, from the notion that only women should
be nurses one might infer a corollary state policy that only certain professions are
also suitable for women, thus constituting an intangible and somewhat speculative
injury to women who desire to enter another profession. And third, there is the even
broader notion that being treated by the state in a stereotypical fashion is itself an
equal protection wrong against the nurse recipients of the treatment, 6 even though
they are otherwise being tangibly benefited by it.
Whatever Justice O'Connor meant, her recognition of the "down side" of
allegedly benign and favorable treatment has significant implications when it is
transferred into the context of the more traditional forms of affirmative action.'7
' 
2 d. at 729. Presumably, if the school had adopted an affirmative action plan on behalf of under-represented
male applicants, Justice O'Connor would have used these same statistics as justification. This, however,
would seem to be inconsistent with her later rejection of "societal discrimination" as a grounds upon which
a public employer can base a reverse discrimination employment plan. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. at 288. On the other hand, in that same case she also left open the possibility that achieving a diverse
faculty might justify racial preferences in a school hiring context, with the source of the lack of diversity
presumably being irrelevant. Id. at 288 n.*. Lack of diversity among the student body, again regardless of
its cause, might be similarly regarded by Justice O'Connor--although her more recent opinions seem to reject
that possibility.
13 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729.
14 Id. at 730.
15 1d. at 729 n.15.
16 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1802 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (employment
decikinn baed on anrsn'f to cctain gender steroeoypes fuund to be iiiegal under Titie
V11).
'7 The idea had already surfaced in the Supreme Court's prior affirmative action cases. See Defunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298
(opinion of Powell, J.); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 531-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Summer, 1990]
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Notwithstanding the existence of remedial objectives, it recognizes that preferential
treatment continues rather than cures the problems of discrimination, in that it
reinforces the false but stereotypical notion that women, Blacks, and other minori-
ties, being innately inferior, cannot obtain positions of importance in any other
way. 8 In any event, Justice O'Connor incorporated the stereotype or stigma thesis
into her analysis in Hogan, the first of her opinions; she was to use it again with great
effect in Croson and Metro Broadcasting , her most recent.
Firefighters Union 1784 v. Stotts:19
THE CLARIFICATION OF A PROCEDURAL POINT,
BUT WITH SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTANTIVE IMPACT
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Stotts probably reflects her experi-
ence as a trial court judge and her resulting attentiveness to the niceties of procedure.
In 1977 a class action had been brought against the city of Memphis, Tennessee,
alleging a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in the hiring and promotion of
firefighters. The city settled the case by entering into a court-approved consent
decree which established a fifty percent minority hiring "goal," and a twenty
percent minority promotion "goal" for vacancies in the department. In 1981,
budget deficits required a substantial reduction in force. Pursuant to a memorandum
of understanding with the union, layoffs were to be determined on the basis of
seniority, and senior employees whose positions were abolished could "bump
down" to a lower position. Black firefighters hired under the consent decree, lacking
sufficient seniority to retain their jobs, sought and obtained a preliminary injunction
against the implementation of the layoff plan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the injunction.
After dealing with a mootness issue, Justice White, speaking for the Court,
addressed the question of whether the district court had the power to issue the
injunction. He noted that the court of appeals had justified it as either an enforcement
of the consent decree or a modification. Justice White concluded that it could be
justified on neither ground. The consent decree itself was silent on the question of
layoffs, and he refused to read in any implied limitations. With respect to the
modification question, Justice White concluded that the district court's power to
unilaterally modify a consent decree was limited by section 706(g) of Title VII, 20 that
11 This raises the interesting question of whether a Black or a women who was philosophically opposed to
an employer's affirmative action plan would have standing to challenge that plan on the grounds that it
attaches a stigma to whatever employment advancement this person might obtain.
19 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
- 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (1982) defines and limits the power of a court to prescribe remedies for Title VII
violations. The last sentence reads as follows:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement, or promotion of an
individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was
refused admission, suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1
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this section allows an award of fictional seniority only to the proven victims of illegal
discrimination, that none of the beneficiaries of the modified consent decree met this
qualification, and that the injunction was therefore improper.
Justice O'Connor joined in the Court's opinion, but felt compelled to also
write a separate concurring opinion to reflect her "understanding" of the Court's
holding. She seemed to enjoy tracing the unusual procedural history of the case,
which she said was necessary in order to appreciate the Court's resolution of both the
mootness issue and the substantive power issue. But she did this with a specific
purpose in mind. She had noted a potential ambiguity in Justice White's opinion, and
her grounds for resolving it add a significant new dimension to the case.
The offending language in Justice White's opinion was this: "It therefore
seems to us that in light of Teamsters, the Court of Appeals imposed on the parties
as an adjunct of settlement something that could not have been ordered had the case
gone to trial and the plaintiffs proved that a pattern or practice of discrimination
existed." 2 Justice O'Connor wanted to clarify the identity of the "case" being
referred to by Justice White.
What Justice White apparently had referred to was the case as originally filed;
if it had gone to trial and the plaintiffs had proven a pattern or practice of
discrimination but failed to prove that every member of the class (or at least those
members who were later to be the beneficiaries of the amended consent decree) was
a victim of this discrimination, then an across-the-board award of compensatory
seniority would have been inappropriate. Justice O'Connor presumably did not
disagree with that proposition.
Justice White's statement, however, arguably left open the possibility that
plaintiffs in Title VII case could enter into a consent decree that was silent with
respect to individual relief and then, if the need arose, come back to court later and
prove individual victim status as the justification for a non-consensual judicial
modification of that consent decree.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion shut the door on that possibility. She
emphasized, as Justice White did not, the finality of the original consent decree. She
noted that the plaintiffs could have gone to trial and proved individual victim status
there, or they could have included the union in the negotiations and identified
specific victims in the consent decree. But, she said, they did none of these things.
Instead, they entered into a consent decree without establishing any specific victim's
identity and thus waived the right to further relief.
account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a)
of this title.
21 Firefighters Union 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 579.
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To allow respondents to obtain relief properly reserved for only identi-
fied victims or to prove their victim status now would undermine the
certainty of obligation that is a condition precedent to employers'
acceptance of, and unions' consent to, employment discrimination
settlements .... Thus, when the Court states that this preferential relief
could not have been awarded even had this case [the injunction case]
gone to trial,... it is holding respondents to the bargain they struck
during the consent decree negotiations in 1980 and thereby further the
statutory policy of voluntary settlement.2
In sum, her procedural point was that the case the Supreme Court was
reviewing involved an injunction modifying a consent decree. "When the Court
disapproves the preliminary injunction issued in this litigation, it does so because
respondents had no chance of succeeding on the merits of their claim.' '23 The reason
they had no chance of succeeding on the merits was because they would be precluded
from proving individual victim status at this late date. Therein lies the important
substantive point. Justice O'Connor seems to be saying the court's unilateral
modification of the consent decree was inappropriate, regardless of whether or not
the relief was otherwise barred by section 706(g) because of the lack of identified
victims. So construed, Stotts allows settlements and consent decrees to operate as
a significant limitation on the power of a district court to later impose some form of
affirmative action relief.24
The second significant aspect of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion is her
restatement of the limitations on the power of a district court to ever provide
affirmative discrimination relief, in light of the limitations of section 706(g).
Although it does not materially vary from the majority's statement,2 5 it is worth
22 Id. at 589.
23 Id. at 589.
24 Justice Stevens, also concurring, thought that Title VII limitations were irrelevant, id. at 590, but would
have allowed the modification if the plaintiffs had been able to show "changed circumstances." Justice
O'Connor believed that Title VII would preclude the modification here, no matter how significant the change
in circumstances. Id. at 588. It is not clear whether her theory about the finality of the consent decree would
allow for a "changed circumstances" exception in situations where the modification would not otherwise
run afoul of Title VII.
25 Justice White, and presumably Justice O'Connor as well, derived this principle of victim-only preferential
relief in part from Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), which established a two-stage process
for proving and then remedying "pattern or practice" (or systemic disparate treatment) employment
discrimination claims. In the first stage, statistical imbalances (the so-called "prima facie" case), which the
employer cannot refute or explain away, constitute proof of the existence of a practice of illegal discrimina-
tion, thus justifying the imposition of prospective injunctive relief and raising a presumption that every
member of the class may have been victimized. In the second stage, however, that presumption is tested, and
individual affirmative relief is then limited to the specific members of the class who have been actually
victimized.
In later cases, Justice O'Connor has repeatedly used the prima facie case part of the Teamsters Stage
I analysis as a basis for determining when voluntary affirmative action of some kind is justified; in Stotts she
also implicitly used the Stage H analysis as the basis for determining who could be a beneficiary of court-
ordered affirmative action. As will be shown later, all that remains is for Justice O'Connor to extend her
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quoting here.
A court may not grant preferential treatment to any individual or group
simply because the group to which they belong is adversely affected by
a bona fide seniority system. Rather, a court may use its remedial
powers, including its power to modify a consent decree, only to prevent
future violations and to compensate identified victims of unlawful
discrimination. . . . Even when its remedial powers are properly
invoked, a district court may award preferential treatment only after
carefully balancing the competing interests of discriminatees, innocent
employees, and the employer.26
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in the Stotts case reveals two things.
It is the first evidence of her tendency to decide cases on the narrowest of possible
grounds; that is, she would have found the injunction impermissible under a waiver
theory, regardless of the statutory limitation. But second, her interpretation of the
somewhat cryptic section 706(g), as limiting court-ordered preferential treatment to
the identified victims of prior discrimination, can be seen as a prediction of a general
unwillingness to read reverse discrimination allowances into the statute.
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education: 27
A FAILED ATTEMPT TO PATCH OVER THE DIFFERENCES
Justice O'Connor's approach to her colleagues in this case is reminiscent of
a harried scout leader trying to bring peace to a quarrelsome group of twelve-year
olds bent on throwing mudballs at each other-- and it achieved about the same degree
of success.
Here, the Board of Education had adopted a hiring goal of having the
percentage of minority teachers mirror the percentage of minority students in the
district. In order to safeguard the achievement of that goal, the Board and the union
had also agreed to a contract term that provided for layoff in reverse order of
seniority, except that the percentage of minority teachers could not drop. When the
Board applied the provision, by laying off non-minority teachers with greater
seniority than minority teachers who were retained, the non-minority teachers sued,
claiming a violation of the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court's judgment was that the layoff provision was unconstitu-
tional. There was, however, no majority opinion. Justice Powell wrote the plurality
Teamsters analogy to include both the Stage I and the Stage II analyses in her evaluation of voluntary
affirmative action plans under both Title VII and the Constitution.
26 lId. at 588.
- 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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opinion, which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist joined totally, and which
Justice O'Connor joined in part. She also wrote a separate opinion, as did Justice
White, who thus provided the fifth vote in support of the judgment. Justice Marshall
wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined; and
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
To put Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in context, and thus evaluate its
significance, it is necessary to first briefly summarize both Justice Powell's opinion
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall.
Justice Powell began with a restatement of the "strict scrutiny" test, which he
said requires that any racial classification, whether it favors racial minorities or not,
be justified by "compelling governmental interest" and that the means chosen to
serve that interest be "narrowly tailored.' '28 The two interests found by the court of
appeals, that of curing the effects of societal discrimination and providing role
models for minority students, he found to be less than compelling.
The Board's interest in curing its own prior discrimination, which was
apparently advanced for the first time before the Supreme Court,29 was recognized
as a legitimate and compelling interest. However, Justice Powell said that when this
interest is asserted, it must be proved. That is, "the trial court must make a factual
determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that
remedial action was necessary., 30 That factual determination was lacking in this
case, he concluded.
In Part IV of the plurality opinion, the part which Justice O'Connor refused to
join, Justice Powell addressed the second prong of the "strict scrutiny" test, namely
the requirement that "the means chosen to accomplish the State's asserted purpose
. . . be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.'"'" He
concluded that the means used in this case could not satisfy the test. Although he
conceded that it is not necessarily impermissible for an affirmative action plan to
impose burdens on "innocent parties,"32 he felt that the burden imposed in this case
was too "intrusive." 33 He contrasted reverse discrimination in hiring, where he said
"the burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a considerable extent
28 Id. at 274.
29 Because the case had been litigated under the societal discrimination and role model theories, the record
contained inadequate evidence with respect to the existence of prior discrimination. Once the theory of the
case changed, the parties found it necessary to file with the Supreme Court what Justice Marshall referred
to as "'submissions' containing factual material that was not considered by the District Court or the Court
of Appeals." Id. at 295. Although Justice Marshall chided the parties for attempting to try the case de novo
before the Supreme Court, he nevertheless relied heavily (albeit selectively) on this extra-record evidence
in justifying his dissent -- for which he, in turn, was chided by Justice Powell. Id. at 278 n.5.
3o Id. at 277.
31 Id. at 280.32 Id. at 281.
33Id. at 283 n.ll.
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among society generally, ' 3 4 with racially based layoff priorities, which he said
"impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals." 35
In dissent, Justice Marshall first disagreed with Justice Powell's use of the
"strict scrutiny" test, claiming instead that remedial racial discrimination should be
allowed if it serves "important government interests" and is "substantially related
to achievement of those objectives." 36 Obviously agreeing with the plurality that
remedying past discrimination was a sufficient interest, Justice Marshall then
concluded that if properly introduced as evidence, the informal findings of the
Michigan Civil Rights Commission, which led to a settlement incorporating the
challenged layoff policy, would provide the requisite evidentiary support.37
Justice Marshall then turned to the question of whether the means used to
achieve the desired purpose met the test, as he earlier had articulated it. He concluded
that it did, in the sense that affirmative protection against layoff was absolutely
necessary in order to make the preferential hiring policy effective. He likewise
concluded that the layoff provision that had been hammered out in the crucible of
racial turmoil was, all things considered, the narrowest and most equitable possible.
Into this maelstrom of conflicting ideas and sometimes strongly worded
opinions walks Justice O'Connor. In the first part of her concurring opinion, she
vainly tries to pour oil on the troubled waters.
With respect to the disagreement over the applicable test, she says that the
"disparities ... do not preclude a fair measure of consensus" and that in most
affirmative action cases the difference between a "compelling" and an "impor-
tant" government interest would be unimportant.38 Citing her colleagues profusely,
she further shows the existence of a Court consensus over a number of propositions:
that remedying past or present discrimination by a state agency is of sufficient
importance to justify a carefully constructed affirmative action program; that this
does not require the existence of contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination,
as long as the agency has a "firm basis" for believing that remedial action is
3 Id. at 282. This is a meaningless assertion. In the last analysis, it is still some specific non-minority
individual (or individuals) who will be denied a job, even if the identify of that individual cannot be
ascertained because he or she is a member of a class, any of whom might be the actual victim -- i.e., the person
who, but for the affirmative action in hiring, would have gotten the job. And while it may make an employer,
and Justice Powell, "feel better" for not knowing the specific victim of the discrimination, the bombardier
whose casualties are anonymous to him is just as culpable as is the sniper who chooses his prey on an
individual basis.
35 Id. at 283 n. 11. Justice Powell apparently would have used the same analysis to justify DeFunis' non-
admission to law school, but not his removal from school during the third year. Id. at 267 n. 1.
3 Id. at 301-02.
3- justice Nl........, thus, would havc rer aided the tun for furter findings of fact. id. at 306. J ustice Powell,
believed that much of the evidence relied on by Justice Marshall had already been introduced into evidence
in one of the earlier related lawsuits, where the court nevertheless concluded that it was insufficient to prove
that the Board had discriminated. Id. at 278-79 n.5.
38 Id. at 286.
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required; that the promotion of racial diversity and other possible interests might
justify some form of affirmative action; and that the constitutionally permitted
means "need not be limited to the remedying of specific instances of identified
discrimination.' 39
Her assertion of unanimity over that last proposition is highly controversial.
It has been read as saying that affirmative action is not necessarily unconstitutional
merely because it prefers individuals who are not the proven victims of prior
discrimination.40 If that is what Justice O'Connor intended to say, then it is not
supported by the "authority" she cites. 41 To the contrary, this authority suggests that
Justice O'Connor was merely referring to the nature of the factual predicate for
affirmative action, not the identity of its beneficiaries. Nevertheless, since this has
now become the critical issue from both a statutory and a constitutional perspective,
it is unfortunate that Justice O'Connor was not more careful in how she phrased her
early claims of unanimity. 2
In any event, she concluded that "in the final analysis, the diverse formula-
tions and the number of separate writings put forth by various Members of the Court
in these difficult cases do not necessarily reflect an intractable fragmentation in
opinion with respect to certain core principles." 43 Justice O'Connor then proceeds
to elaborate further on these points of agreement, as well as others made in the parts
of the plurality opinion to which she subscribed.
39 Id. at 287.
4 See Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78,80 n. 17
(1986).
4 Wyant, 476 U.S. at 267. In support of the alleged unanimity on this issue, she cites page 289 of her own
concurring opinion, which merely rejects the necessity of'"a contemporaneous or antecedent finding of past
discrimination by a court or other competent body," but which does not address the separate issue of the
necessity of identifying specific victims to whom the affirmative action is offered by way of remedy. She
also cites pages 277-78 of Justice Powell's opinion, which is likewise totally silent on this critical issue. And
finally, she cites page 305 of Justice Marshall's dissent, where he does reject both the necessity of formal
findings and the separate notion that affirmative action be "limited to remedying specific instances of
identifiable discrimination" -- and then attributes this view back to both Justice O'Connor and Justice
Powell, by reference to the same pages Justice O'Connor cited. By this tour de force, Justice Marshall has
Justice O'Connor saying something that she probably did not intend to say.
Finally, the claim of unanimity on the victim-specific issue is belied by Justice White's concurrence,
where he gives special attention to the fact that none of the beneficiaries "has been shown to be a victim of
any racial discrimination." Id. at 295 (White, J., concurring).
42 Unfortunately, Supreme Court decisions are often drafted largely by law clerks, although this apparently
varies from Justice to Justice. However, it has been reported that "Justice O'Connor does little original
drafting of opinions and confines herself to relatively light editing when she is satisfied with the substance."
Taylor, Swing Vote on the Constitution, AM. LAW., June 1989, at 69. This may explain the lack of correlation
between what she seems to say and the authority she cites in support of it.
11 Justice Marshall also distilled two "noteworthy" results from among the various opinions: "a majority
of the Court has explicitly rejected the argument that an affirmative-action plan must be preceded by a formal
finding that the entity seeking to institute the plan has committed discriminatory acts in the past; and the Court
has left open whether layoffs may be used as an instrument of remedial action." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 312
n.7. The latter result can be attributed to Justice O'Connor's refusal to join in Part IV of the plurality opinion,
a refusal that was no doubt gratifying to Justice Marshall.
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Of particular interest is her discussion of the nature and allocation of the
burden of proof in a reverse discrimination case. She indicated that the burden is on
the plaintiffs who are challenging the affirmative action plan, and suggests that this
burden is satisfied by merely showing that "the purpose and effect of the plan is to
impose a race-based classification ""--an easily satisfied burden in most affirmative
action cases. She then suggests that the burden shifts to the defendant to submit
evidence demonstrating that it had a "firm basis for believing that remedial action
was appropriate." 45 As an example of what evidence would suffice, she suggests
proof of a statistical disparity between the percentage of qualified minorities
employed by the school and the percentage of qualified minorities in the relevant
labor pool. 46 If the defendant employer satisfies that burden, then she says that the
ultimate burden is on the plaintiffs to show that the statistical evidence does not in
fact support an inference of intentional discrimination or that the plan is not
"narrowly tailored."
Although Justice O'Connor does not yet cite the case by name, she is
obviously relying here on the first part of the Teamsters test for proving systemic
disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII.47 In a Teamsters case, the
plaintiff can use statistics to establish what the Court referred to as a "prima facie
case." 48 Then, a burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's
case by showing that the statistics are "either inaccurate or insignificant." 49 If the
defendant fails to do this, then the court may conclude that a violation has occurred
and at least order prospective relief.50 Since under the full Teamsters analysis
liability does not attach until the plaintiff's statistics have survived challenge by the
defendant, Justice O'Connor is technically correct in saying that her borrowing of
the "prima facie case" aspect, as providing justification for affirmative action, does
not impose on a public employer "the burden of convincing the court of its liability
for prior unlawful discrimination.'
Although the Teamsters test will play a key role in the evolution of Justice
O'Connor's affirmative action jurisprudence, it was not the reason why she wrote a
separate concurring opinion here. Rather, Justice O'Connor's disagreement with the
plurality was over the need for even deciding whether this layoff procedure or any
layoff procedure is an impermissible means for achieving the objective of remedying
4Id. at 292-93.
45 Id. at 293.
4Id. at 292.
41 Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
41 Id. at 336.
49 Id. at 360. Normally, a plaintiff will attempt to either (1) disprove the accuracy of the data or the validity
of the plaintiff's statistical methodology; (2) neutralize the statistics with counter-statistics tending to show
the absence of discrimination: or (3) explain the statistics away hy ,hnwing twh_t tha fsisrty causedby
factors other than intentional discrimination. See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984) cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1115 (1985); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982).
10 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361.
11 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. at 292.
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past discrimination. 52 Since an alternative grounds was available, she hoped to avoid
the issue that so bitterly divided the plurality and the dissenters.
Her alternative ground was this: By its own terms, the hiring goal was linked
to achieving a parity between the percentage of minority teachers and the percentage
of minority students. But since a disparity in that regard is no evidence of
discrimination, 53 the hiring goal itself had no relation to the remedying of employ-
ment discrimination, and the layoff provision which was intended to safeguard that
hiring goal was likewise unrelated to the state interest being asserted -- thus consti-
tuting an impermissible means.
Justice O'Connor's attempt to find common ground was unavailing. Justice
Marshall said he could not go along with her thesis, because there was no record
evidence showing the absence of a disparity between workforce and labor pool
populations at the time the layoffs occurred.54 The plurality, on the other hand, was
apparently discontent with the narrowness of her approach. One can only surmise
that Justice Powell and the others saw the need to address a constitutional issue of
this importance from the perspective of broader principles, and to construct a theory
of affirmative-action/equal-protection analysis that would be instructive of the
limits beyond which the state cannot go. Justice O'Connor would have done better
to have joined that effort and used her influence to incorporate into the constitutional
equation some of her Stotts philosophy about proper beneficiaries of "remedial"
reverse discrimination.
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC: 5
AGAIN THE SEARCH FOR NARROW BuT COMMON GROUND
The conciliatory tone that Justice O'Connor adopted in Wygant is totally
lacking in her concurring/dissenting opinion in this case. Indeed, she could barely
keep her pique under control. Her opinion does contain a common ground on which
most of the Court could have stood, without abandoning any of their more
fundamental beliefs about the permissibility of affirmative action, but once again she
was unsuccessful in forging that consensus.
2 Nevertheless, one commentator has concluded that "the tenor of her opinion ... radiated a receptivity to
the Powell position." Buchanan, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County: A Paradigm of
Affirmative Action, 26 Hous. L. REV. 229, 262 (1989).
" Justice O'Connor cites Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977), a Title VII
case, in support of that proposition.
14 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 300 n.3. The only evidence of this consisted of certain extra-record "lodgings," in
the form of statistical charts prepared by the plaintiffs. Justice Marshall, however, was not willing for the
Court to'engage in factfinding on this issue, suggesting that if the matter were relevant then it should be a
subject of inquiry on remand.
55 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
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This case involved a labor union and its affiliated apprenticeship committee
that had been found guilty of racial discrimination in the administration of its
apprenticeship and membership admissions policies. Among the remedies ulti-
mately imposed by the district court were the establishment of a fund designed to
increase the pool of qualified minority applicants and the establishment of a goal of
29.23% minority membership by a date certain. The union challenged these
remedies on both statutory and constitutional grounds, with their principal argument
being that "they extend race-conscious preferences to individuals who are not the
identified victims of petitioner's unlawful discrimination."
56
The Court upheld the imposition of these remedies. There was, however, no
majority opinion on the critical affirmative action issue. Justice Brennan wrote a
plurality opinion, which was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
Justice Powell agreed with the result, on essentially the same grounds as the plurality,
but explained and justified it in less sweeping terms than Justice Brennan. On the
affirmative action issue, Justice O'Connor dissented, as did Justices White and
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger.
The union had argued that a requirement that it grant membership preferences
to minority applicants was expressly prohibited by section 706(g) of Title VII, the
last sentence-of which in essence prohibits a court from ordering a union to admit an
individual who was "refused admission.., for any reason other than discrimina-
tion." 5 7 Adopting his version of a "plain meaning" interpretation of the statute,
Justice Brennan concluded that this does not literally say that affirmative relief must
be limited to the specific victims of past discrimination. Justice Brennan concluded,
moreover, that such relief was indeed consistent with the broader purposes of the act,
that it was supported by, rather than inconsistent with, the legislative history, and that
such relief was not foreclosed by the Court's decision in Stotts. In that regard, Justice
Brennan admitted that there was language in Stotts which seemed to preclude the
award of affirmative relief to any non-victims. First intimating that this was mere
dicta, he nevertheless went on to distinguish Stotts on the ground that the affirmative
relief there flowed to specific individual non-victims while the affirmative relief in
this case flowed to the entire class.
With respect to when this type of affirmative action relief could be ordered,
Justice Brennan laid down a four-pronged test: (1) that such relief be necessary to
remedy the discrimination and erase its lingering effects; (2) that the percentage
figure be regarded as a flexible goal rather than a strict racial quota; (3) that it be a
temporary measure; (4) and that it not unnecessarily trammel the rights and interests
of non-minority employees. He concluded that the order in this case met all the
requirements.
In dealing with the equal protection issue, Justice Brennan admitted a lack of
56 1d. at 440.
1142 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (1982).
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Court consensus on the proper test, but said the order in this case satisfied even the
most stringent one. Despite the fact that his was only a plurality opinion with respect
to the affirmative action issue, Justice Brennan nevertheless put together a statement
of the "holding" which he said six members of the Court agreed to, namely "that
a district court may, in appropriate circumstances, order preferential relief benefiting
individuals who are not the actual victims of discrimination as a remedy for
violations of Title VII." 58 Justice Brennan obviously recognized the centrality of
that point in the entire affirmative action debate and was thus determined to get it on
the record.
It is against the background of the plurality opinion that Justice O'Connor's
concurring/dissenting 59 opinion must be viewed. She first briefly took Justice
Brennan to task for his contrived and cavalier treatment of the Stotts case, which she
said read section 706(g) "as embodying a policy against court-ordered remedies
under Title VII that award racial preferences in employment to individuals who have
not been subjected to unlawful discrimination.' '60 But conceding Justice Brennan's
point that a majority of the Court was now willing to allow some court-ordered
affirmative relief to non-victims, 61 she then proceeded to base her dissent on
narrower grounds.
Seizing upon Justice Brennan's distinction between permissible goals and
impermissible quotas, she argued with considerable vigor that remedial racial quotas
were absolutely prohibited by the statute. She derived this from section 7030) which
provides that "nothing contained in this sub-chapter [including, she said, the
remedial power granted by section 706(g)] shall be interpreted to require any
employer.., to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group ... on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race... employ[ed] by any employ[er]." 62 She then
proceeded to distinguish permissible goals from impermissible quotas, as follows:
To be consistent with §703(j), a racial hiring or membership goal must
be intended to serve merely as a benchmark for measuring compliance
with Title VII and eliminating the lingering effects of past discrimina-
tion, rather than as a rigid numerical requirement that must uncondition-
ally be met on pain of sanctions. To hold an employer or union to
58 Local 28, 478 U.S. at 482. The six consisted of the four who subscribed to the plurality opinion itself
(Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens), plus Justice Powell who concurred separately and
Justice White who, though he dissented, did make that concession.
19 The concurring aspects of her opinion were limited to the Court's conclusions about the propriety of the
statistical evidence that the district court relied on, the non-punitive nature of the contempt citations, and the
authority of the district court to appoint an administrator. On the critical affirmative action issue, her opinion
is pure dissent.
'
1 Local 28, 478 U.S. at 489.
6" Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, held firm to the position that section 706(g) does not
allow the granting of relief to those who were not victims at the expense of innocent non-minority workers
injured by racial preferences." Id. at 500.
62 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j) (1982).
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achievement of a particular percentage of minority employment or
membership, and to do so regardless of circumstances such as economic
conditions or the number of available qualified minority applicants, is
to impose an impermissible quota. By contrast, a permissible goal
should require only a good faith effort on the employer's or union's part
to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself.6 3
Relying then on the mandatory language of the district court order and the
analysis of Judge Winter's dissent in the Court of Appeals, Justice O'Connor found
that under this test the remedial order qualified as a quota rather than a goal. Justice
White agreed with that assessment,64 and Justice Powell would have agreed but for
the fact that the district court had previously enforced its order in a flexible rather
than a rigid manner.65
Instead of standing fast to her position in Stotts that section 703(g) precludes
the award of any affirmative relief to non-victims, Justice O'Connor's endless search
for the middle ground led her instead into the Serbonian Bog66 of the hazy distinction
between "goals" and "quotas." 67
Local 93, Firefighters v. Cleveland. 68
A CONCURRENCE WITHOUT A PURPOSE
The issue in this case was whether section 706(g) precludes court approval of
a consent decree which affords preferential promotion treatment to minority em-
ployees who were not shown to have ever been the victim of the employer's
discriminatory practices. As Justice Rehnquist argued vigorously in his dissent, one
would have thought the issue had been resolved by the decision in Stotts.
Justice Brennan, however, again narrowly construed Stotts. His interpretation
of the decision to which he originally dissented was that it merely held that section
706(g) imposed a limit on the power of the district court to unilaterally modify a
consent decree over the objections of the parties, but that the section imposed no
63 Local 28, 478 U.S. at 495.
64 Id. at 499-50 (agreeing with Judge Winter's conclusion that as a practical matter compliance with the order
would require the displacement of nonminority members).
65 Id. at 489 n.4.
"A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog... where armies whole have sunk." J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST,
Book II, 1.592. The reference is to a" large marshy tract of land in the northern part of ancient Egypt in which
entire armies are said to have been swallowed up." The Random House Dictionary of the English Language
1302 (1966).
67 The parties in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288, had engaged in the same fruitless
quabbliig over whether to iabei the medical school's preferential admissions policy the establishment of a
"goal" of the filling of a "quota." As Justice Powell correctly pointed out, "this semantic distinction is
beside the point." Id. at 289. See also, Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1320 (1986).
68 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
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limits on consent decrees that were the result of voluntary agreement. The relevant
limits, rather, were those contained in the substantive provisions of section 703 of
the statute, as construed by Weber.
Justice O'Connor concurred, in her shortest affirmative action opinion yet,
explaining that "I write separately to emphasize that the Court's holding is a narrow
one." 6 9 It is not clear what Justice O'Connor thought she was accomplishing by this.
Justice Brennan had four other subscribers to his opinion anyway, making it a true
majority opinion, and her concurrence thus in no way limits the precedential
significance of the case. Indeed, it is not even clear what she objected to in Justice
Brennan's opinion.70 Her primary focus was in assuaging Justice White's fear that
the decision eliminated the need for any factual predicate for the adoption of race-
conscious practices, which she says is not what the Court held or even suggested.
Beyond that, while she attempts to strip the majority opinion bare of everything but
its holding, she does not provide any alternative explanation for the decision.
Three unadorned points thus emerge from her concurring opinion. First, she
believes that voluntary affirmative action plans are to be evaluated under the
substantive provisions of section 703, presumably as construed by Weber, while the
validity of court-ordered affirmative relief must be judged under section 706(g).
While this is technically correct, it does not address the qvestion of why the policy
of section 706(g) should not be read into the section 703 substantive provision.
Second, she apparently believes that the standards are different; while section 706(g)
prohibits a court from ordering preferential treatment to anyone but a proven victim,
section 703 presumably allows for some degree of greater latitude in this regard.
This leaves unanswered the critical question of how much more latitude is allowed,
and why. And third, she believes that consent decrees fall in the "voluntary" rather
than "court-ordered" category. Given her expertise as a proceduralist, it would
have been interesting to have seen her attempt to deal with Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent on that point.
In sum, while Justice O'Connor's position is sometimes unclear when she
explains it, as in the earlier cases, it is doubly so when she does not, as in this case.
United States v. Paradise: 71
No AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN TERROREM
This case marks the entrance of Justice O'Connor's first full-blown dissent. It
69 Id. at 530.
70 It has been reported by a former clerk to Justice Brennan that during his tenure of employment Justice
O'Connor was "especially reluctant to join Brennan's opinions, even when her own positions were similar,
whether because she was 'uncomfortable with the rhetoric, or uncertain what little time bombs had been
planted by Brennan's clerks and wanted to make her understanding of the Court's holding clear."' Taylor,
supra note 42, at 68.
71 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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involved what was repeatedly referred to as "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate
discriminatory conduct" 72 by the Alabama Department of Public Safety and its
continued refusal to develop a promotion policy that did not have an adverse effect
on Black troopers. Ultimately, the federal district court imposed a one-for-one
promotional quota that was subject to three conditions: the existence of qualified
Blacks, an under representation of Blacks in the higher rank,73 and the absence of a
departmentally developed promotion plan that did not have an adverse impact.
Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court and delivered a plurality
opinion which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joined. Again noting the
lack of consensus on the proper standard for evaluating equal protection claims,
Justice Brennan nevertheless opted for an application of the strict scrutiny test, and
proceeded to show how the district court's fifty percent promotion quota survived
even that more stringent standard.
Justice Stevens took the position that judicial discretion in ordering affirma-
tive race-conscious relief was subject only to a requirement of "reasonableness. 74
Although on this point Justice Stevens was apparently in disagreement with the
entire Court, he chose to blame Justice O'Connor for advancing "the novel
theory" 75 that some stricter standard of review is necessary.
Justice O'Connor did indeed dissent, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia; Justice White said that he agreed with "much" of what
she said. True to form, Justice O'Connor rested her case on relatively narrow factual
grounds, rather than on any broad constitutional principles. 76 Her point was this:
"The order at issue in this case clearly has one purpose, and one purpose only -- to
compel the Department to develop a promotion procedure that would not have an
adverse impact on blacks. ,77 Since that objective could be achieved by alternatives
not involving racial classifications, alternatives which the district court did not even
consider, she concluded that the one-for-one promotion quota was in no way
"necessary" or "narrowly tailored" and that Justice Brennan's purported78 appli-
cation of a strict scrutiny test was thus a sham. To the contrary, she concluded that
"given the singular in terrorem purpose of the district court order, it cannot survive
72 Id. at 167 (Justice Brennan's plurality opinion) & 196 (quoted in Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion).
73 The ultimate objective was to attain a 25% Black representation, since that reflected the percentage of
Blacks in the relevant labor market.
74 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 190.
71 Id. at 190 n. 1.
76 Professor Graglia has observed that "[b]ecause she refused to reject the fundamental fallacy that granting
benefits to some individuals on the basis of race can be justified as a remedy for injuries to different
individuals, she could not argue that all such discrimination was impermissible, and she was reduced to
quibbling about when, according to her more fastidious taste, it would be permissible." Graglia, The
"-Remedy" Rationale for Requiring or Permitting Otherwise Prohibited Discrimination: How the Court
Overcame the Constitution and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 569, 605 (1988).
'n Paradise, 480 U.S. at 197.
78 Id. (the plurality "purports to apply strict scrutiny"); Id. at 200 (the plurality, "purporting to apply strict
scrutiny").
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strict scrutiny." 7 9
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County: 80
STARE DECISIS, STATISTICS, AND SEX
Since in the past women "had not been strongly motivated to seek training or
employment" 8' in the skilled positions with the Santa Clara County road depart-
ment, the result was that there were no women in those positions, even though
women constituted approximate thirty-six percent of the area labor force. Appar-
ently believing this raw statistical disparity was itself evidence of some kind of social
evil requiring governmental correction, the Agency set about to alter those statistics
by adopting an "Affirmative Action Plan." Parity was established as a long-term
goal, with the more realistic short-term goal of the "social engineers" 82 being that
of merely taking sex "into account" when making employment and promotion
decisions.
When the promotional position of road dispatcher became available, twelve
employees applied for it. Seven of these were certified as eligible for appointment,
including Paul Johnson (male) and Diane Joyce (female). Johnson scored higher on
the initial interview than Joyce, and after a second interview a panel of agency
supervisors recommended that Johnson be promoted. Prior to the second interview,
Joyce contacted the County Affirmative Action Office, who contacted the Agency's
Affirmative Action Coordinator, who then intervened with a recommendation that
Joyce be promoted. The head of the Agency, who had discretion to promote any of
the seven, chose Joyce. Johnson brought suit under Title VII.
Speaking for a majority of five, Justice Brennan stated that the legality of the
affirmative action plan was to be determined under the Weber criteria -- i.e., the
existence of a "conspicuous ... imbalance in traditionally segregated job catego-
ries," a plan to correct this unbalance which does not "unnecessarily trammel the
interests of the white employees" (e.g., result in anyone's discharge), which does not
79 Id. at 199.
80 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
81 Id. at 621 (summarizing what was said in the Agency's affirmative action plan).
82 The term is derived from Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HAv. L. Rev.
1312, 1313 (1986):
During the late 1960s, the civil rights community began to splinter and, certainly by the mid-
1970s, much of its leadership had become preoccupied with equality of results. ... Absent
discrimination, these result-oriented leaders claimed, all groups would be represented in the
institutions and occupations of society roughly in proportion to their representation in the
population. These leaders continue to believe that the only way to measure equality is in
terms of such representation, and that it is the government's role to bring about proportional
representation in short order. Because this new vision of the civil rights movement requires
the attainment of predetermined ends, rather than the abolition of barriers to fair participa-
tion, I will call its adherents "social engineers."
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create "an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees," which is designed
as a temporary measure to "eliminate a manifest racial imbalance" rather than
maintain a racial balance. He concluded that the Agency affirmative action plan, as
applied to Joyce, satisfied those criteria.
Justice O'Connor refused to join the majority opinion, because of its "expan-
sive and ill-defined approach to voluntary affirmative action by public employ-
ers. '"83 Apparently, the bone of contention lay in the majority's refusal to read
constitutional constraints into Title VII when the statute is being applied against a
public employer.84 The majority read Weber as merely requiring the existence of a
"conspicuous... imbalance in traditionally segregated work categories," regard-
less of whether that imbalance was of such statistical significance as to also
constitute proof of a prima facie case of discrimination by the employer in question.
In Wygant, however, for constitutional purposes the factual predicate of an affirma-
tive action plan was said to be the existence of a "firm basis" for believing that
remedial action was necessary, which was then defined in terms of a statistical
disparity sufficient to support a prima facie case.
Although that was the point of difference, Justice O'Connor's position is not
entirely clear. If her concurring opinion is read narrowly, then it merely says that the
stronger factual predicate of Wygant is read into Title VII only when a public
employer is involved. 85 However, she nowhere expressly limits her theory in that
fashion. To the contrary, she asserts that Weber and Wygant involved the same
underlying concerns, and concludes that the Wygant analysis is entirely consistent
with the Weber analysis. That conclusion, however, is untenable in light of the
Court's studied refusal in Weber to adopt the "arguable violation" theory of Judge
Wisdom, who had dissented below.86 It would thus appear that Justice O'Connor's
penchant for stare decisis, which led her to refuse to join the dissent in overruling
Weber,87 does not preclude some imaginative reinterpretation of the precedent, in a
manner reminiscent of Justice Brennan's treatment of Stotts.
Justice O'Connor then purports to apply her test to the facts of this case,
emphasizing the importance of paying close attention to both the affirmative action
plan and the manner in which it was applied with respect to Joyner and Johnson. She
notes that the long-term goal was to obtain a parity between the percentage of women
employed by the Agency and the percentage of women in the Santa Clara County
workforce. She then says that if the Agency had used this goal in making hiring
decisions, it would have violated Title VII. This is true, because that statistical
8 3Johnson, 480 U.S. at 648.
Compare her comments, id. at 649, with the majority's response, id. at 627 n.6 & 632.
"That is certainly an element of her original statement of the thesis. "In my view, the proper initial inquirv
in evaluating the legality of an affirmative action plan by a public employer under Title VII is not different
from that required by the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 649 (emphasis added).
6 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87 Johnson, 480 U.S. 648.
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disparity would not be probative under the Teamsters prima facie case analysis.
Rather, she said that to constitute a permissible goal, the desired parity must be
between the percentage of women employed by the Agency in the relevant job and
the percentage of qualified women in the area workforce. She then compared the
percentage of women employed by the agency in skilled craft positions (none) with
the percentage of qualified women in the area workforce (5%), and concluded that
the Agency thus had a "firm basis" for believing that remedial affirmative action
was justified.
The Johnson facts may reveal how Justice O'Connor's "factual predicate"
for affirmative action differs slightly from a total Stage I proof of discrimination
under Teamsters. In a systemic disparate treatment class action, the plaintiffs would
undoubtedly attempt to establish the prima facie case by using the comparison
referred to by Justice O'Connor. This would not, however, constitute a liability-
attaching proof of discrimination until these statistics survived the employer's
rebuttal evidence. When the percentage of qualified women in the area workforce
is as low as it was in this case, an employer could undoubtedly neutralize the
plaintiff's statistics with counter-statistics -- namely, a comparison of the percentage
of women employed by the Agency in these job categories with the percentage of
qualified applicants with this specific employer.88
Justice O'Connor apparently would not consider these counter-statistics
relevant to the question of whether an employer had the requisite "factual predi-
cate" for adopting an affirmative action plan of some kind.89 But these counter-
statistics should be relevant to Justice O'Connor in determining what kind of
affirmative action is permitted. If the plaintiffs in this case could have shown that
the applicant flow was sufficiently low so as to make the disparity statistically
insignificant, then the "inexorable zero' '90 number of women in skilled positions at
the time the affirmative action plan was adopted would have to be explained by
reference to so-called "societal discrimination" -- namely, the sterotypcial notion
that road maintenance is not "women's work." Justice O'Connor could have then
further reasoned that while government may have a legitimate or at least unobjec-
tionable interest in remedying that kind of past discrimination through active
recruitment and encouragement of women to enter the field, the holding in Wygant
precludes the use of "societal discrimination" as the justification for affirmative
action in the form of preferential treatment by a government agency that had not in
fact previously discriminated.
88 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Teamsters recognized the superiority of actual applicant flow data, although
it allowed the use of more generalized statistics in that case. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 342 n.23.
And applicant flow data is frequently used to rebut the plaintiffs' more generalized statistics. See, e.g., Lee
v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 625 F.2d 1235, 1238 (5th Cir. 1980); Valentino v. U.S. Postal Serv., 511
F. Supp. 917, 953 (D.D.C. 1981), aff d, 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
89 And perhaps this is what she means when she says that her statistical imbalance approach does not require
an employer to "prove" its prior discrimination. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 652.
90 Id. at 657 (quoting from Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 342 n.23).
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Justice O'Connor did not take that approach. Rather, having established the
necessary "firm basis" for an affirmative action plan of some kind, Justice
O'Connor then proceeded to evaluate preferential treatment aspects of it from a far
more tolerant perspective. In this regard, she agreed with Justice Scalia that "an
affirmative action program that automatically and blindly promotes those margin-
ally qualified candidates falling within a preferred race or gender category" would
violate Title VII. 91 Justice O'Connor, however, goes on to say that this is not such
a case because the Director of the Agency, in addition to Joyce's sex, also took into
account the relative qualifications, test score, experience, and background.
Like Justice Powell in Bakke, Justice O'Connor obviously believes that using
race or sex as merely a "plus factor" somehow excuses or justifies the resulting
discrimination against a person not sharing that racial or sexual characteristic. 92
However, she fails to explain why that is so.93 A decision-maker's alleged reliance
on a variety of criteria, with race or sex only being "one factor," may have the
appearance of greater fairness and of thus modulating the harm to employees who
lack that factor. To be sure, it gives the white male a chance to compete that is lacking
when race or sex is an absolute prerequisite. And in this case the Agency Director
said that if Joyce's experience had been less than Johnson's by a greater margin than
it was, then he might have gotten the promotion.94 That, however, was of small
consolation to Johnson. Because of his sex, greater experience requirements (which
he lacked) were imposed on him than were imposed on her. Thus, even though it was
only "one factor" in the decision, it was also the decisive one; sex was as much a
"but for" cause of his non-promotion as sex would have been were it the sole and
absolute prerequisite. In sum, Justice O'Connor's disagreement with Justice Scalia
is based on a distinction without a difference.
The broader implications of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion are even
91 Id. at 656.
92 On the other hand, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989), involving proof of causation
in a mixed motive employment discrimination case, Justice O'Connor indicated that even if race or sex is
nothing more than a "substantial factor" in reaching a negative employment decision (i.e., a "minus" rather
than a "plus" factor), this nevertheless satisfies the first step in the proof of a Title VII violation. Id. at 1798.
Justice O'Connor, thus, uses the same "additional factor" analysis to both establish illegal discrimination,
on the one hand, and to justify its exercise, on the other. This is nonsensical. If affirmative discrimination
is going to be justified, it must be by reference to something other than the fact that it is discriminatory.
93 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 265 U.S. at 317 (opinion of Powell, J.); see also, Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 498-99 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell, however, used the "plus factor"
analysis within the context of an admissions program that was designed to serve the school's interest in
achieving a diverse student body; in that context there is a rational nexus between the interest and the means
being used to serve it. But the state interest in Johnson, according to Justice O'Connor's theory, was
presumably that of remedying prior discrimination, not in achieving sexual diversity for its own sake. And
it is not clear how the "plus factor" approach relates to or serves that remedial interest. To the contrary, it
would seem that an absolute rather than a relative preference would be more logical.
94 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 656. This is like telling him that he would have won the race if he just could have
run his 120 yards faster than she ran her 100 yards. That is hardly more fair than disqualifying him from the
race altogether.
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more troubling. First, she unwittingly but implicitly recognizes as a legitimate goal,
under both the statute and the Constitution, the achievement of fixed ethnic and
sexual employee ratios. That is why the Transportation Agency adopted its
affirmative action plan. Although Justice O'Connor tries desperately to fit this case
into a remedial mold, she is ultimately unsuccessful in either altering or disguising
its true shape. It is thus unfortunate that she did not simply condemn it for what it
was.
95
Second, under her approach, if the requisite statistical disparity exists, then
there are virtually no practical limits on an employer's power to engage in reverse
discrimination. Justice O'Connor's "plus factor" analysis is simply an invitation
to fraud. How is a court to determine whether an employer really used race or sex
merely as a weighted "plus factor" rather than as the sole or determinative factor?
Most employers who adopt affirmative action plans -- usually out of fear of
litigation, loss of government contracts, or just bad publicity -- are interested in
achieving results (proper employment statistics), not in the fairness of the process
(taking many factors into account). The easiest way to achieve those results is to
exercise an absolute preference until the desired parity is reached. Justice O'Connor
says you cannot do that, because it is not fair to non-minorities. But she then allows
employers to accomplish exactly the same result, subject only to the requirement that
they go through the motions of considering and weighing a variety of factors.
9 6
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Johnson makes a mockery of her
assertion in Hogan that gender-conscious decision making is permissible under the
Equal Protection clause in only "limited circumstances." 97 To the contrary, her
approach sanctifies affirmative action in its most common and widespread form.
The inexplicability of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in this case has thus
led some to suspect that she was simply unwilling to deny to Joyce what she herself
had been the beneficiary of-- namely, a "plus factor" form of sex-based affirmative
action.98 One early commentator, recognizing the irony of a conservative/female
affirmative action appointment to the Supreme Court, described Justice O'Connor's
91 Accord, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. at 342 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The Equal Protection Clause
commands the elimination of racial [and sexual] barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our theory of
how society ought to be organized"); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 529 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (" since the guarantee
of equal protection immunizes from capricious governmental treatment 'persons' -- not 'races,' it can never
countenance laws that seek racial balance as a goal in and of itself").
96 Critics have claimed that the "one factor" approach of Bakke is being used by law school admissions
committees as a verbal facade behind which they hide what is in fact a policy of admitting a fixed number
of percentage of minority students. In Marsh v. Board of Educ., 581 F. Supp. 614, 625-26 n.64 (E.D. Mich.
1983), the court said it hoped this was not happening. "The Tartuffe of the law would be the law school
professor who lectures his students in the morning on the devious way by which the southern school districts
avoided Brown v. Board of Education and then -- later in the day -- devises strategies for evading and
frustrating the law of Bakke." Justice O'Connor's "one factor" approach to affirmative action is subject
to the same potential for manipulation.
I Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728.
91 Graglia, supra note 76, at 614.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/4
MUGWUMP, MEDIATOR, MACHIAVELLIAN, OR MAJORITY?
dilemma in the following terms:
While she accepts the inevitability of her representative role with grace,
she looks ahead to the time when sex identity will lose its significance
in the selection of public officials. She has an ideal of the sex neutrality
in political roles which is in advance of the culture .... 99
In Johnson, Justice O'Connor may have indeed played a "representative
role" pleasing to those of the feminist persuasion. In the next case, however, she
comes much closer to her ideal -- and with a delightful vengeance!
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company:100
A DEATH KNELL FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?
This case involved a Richmond, Virginia, thirty percent minority business set-
aside ordinance. A six to three majority of the Supreme Court agreed that the
ordinance violated the equal protection clause. Although the majority view was
expressed in four separate opinions, a strong anti-affirmative action coalition
seemed to be drawing together. Justice Marshall offered fierce and lengthy
resistance, but he was eventually forced to concede the battle and, for the moment,
the larger campaign against strict scrutiny of race-conscious remedial efforts. And
though far from surrendering the cause altogether, Justice Blackmun's short but
melancholy dissent was surely reflective of the gloom in the liberal camp.
The case was seen by many as sounding the death knell for affirmative action,
and Justice O'Connor delivered the principal eulogy. Although she was unable to
garner majority support for all of her points, Justice O'Connor advanced them with
unusual vigor and style. She overcame a difficult precedent upholding a similar kind
of affirmative action; she hammered home the need for strict scrutiny of all racially-
based governmental decisions, whether benign or otherwise; and she demonstrated
that her requirement of a "factual predicate" had some teeth to it.
In justifying its set-aside program, the City relied primarily on the Supreme
Court's prior decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick,10 l which upheld a ten percent federal
set-aside on behalf of minority government contractors. Croson relied on Wygant,
and successfully convinced the court of appeals that since the city had not shown that
it had previously discriminated against minority contractors, the factual predicate for
affirmative action was lacking. Justice O'Connor found that neither case was
controlling.
91 Cook, supra note 3, at 326.
0 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
101 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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Central to her treatment of both cases is the implicit assumption that employ-
ment affirmative action must be justified by reference to remedial purposes. 10 2 With
respect to Wygant, Justice O'Connor then drew a distinction between affirmative
action in government employment and affirmative action in government spending.
Although her explication of this distinction is less than clear, it apparently turns on
the potential that each form of government action has for being remedial (albeit still
not in the victim-specific sense of the word). In the hiring context, affirmative
discrimination by a government agency can serve to remedy either so-called
"societal discrimination"10 3 which has produced certain employment patterns or
prior discrimination by the specific government agency itself. In Wygant, the Court
said that the former remedial purpose was impermissible, thus leaving nothing but
the latter as the necessary factual predicate. Government spending, however, has the
potential for" remedying" prior discrimination by identifiable actors other than the
spending agency itself -- namely prime contractors who may have discriminated
against minority-controlled subcontractors. In other words, she was apparently
saying that Wygant merely held that an affirmative action actor cannot attempt to
remedy societal discrimination; Wygant did not say that the prior discrimination had
to be limited to the affirmative action actor personally -- thus leaving it open to allow
an affirmative action actor to also attempt to remedy the discrimination of someone
for whom the actor was indirectly responsible.
With Wygant out of the way, Justice O'Connor then turned to Fullilove. Like
many of the Supreme Court's affirmative action cases, there was no majority opinion
in that case, which made it ripe for being restated in newer terms and then
distinguished. Justice O'Connor's restatement, however, again failed to garner a
majority -- thus leaving the exact nature of the relationship between the two cases
something of a mystery.
It would have been better if she had simply repudiated the decision as standing
for nothing. Instead, she began with Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion which
had emphasized that Congress had an express power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment to enforce the equal protection guarantee, a power not granted to the
states. This seems to be saying that "a law that is an equal protection violation when
enacted by a State becomes transformed into an equal protection guarantee when
enacted by Congress," a proposition to which Justice Kennedy could not assent.l°0
Although she obviously did not explicate her position with sufficient clarity to
satisfy Justice Kennedy, one can assume that Justice O'Connor was saying some-
102 Previously, Justice O'Connor had left open the possibility that "diversity" might serve as a compelling
interest in some employment contexts. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 n.*. In this case, however, she asserted that
racial classifications must be "strictly reserved for remedial settings." City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 721.
Justice Stevens, pursuing his "future benefits" theory of affirmative action, objected to this apparent
narrowing of legitimate state interests. Id. at 730-31 & n. 1.
103 This, of course, is a misnomer. Discrimination can only be practiced by persons, individually or
corporately. "Society" is neither of those. What the term actually connotes is merely the observable results
of discrimination by a large number of otherwise unidentified actors.
1o Id. at 734 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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thing less nonsensical than that. The clue may lie in her quotation from Justice
Powell's concurring opinion, to the effect that "'the degree of specificity required in
thefindings of discrimination and the breadth of discretion in the choice of remedies
may vary with the nature and authority of the governmental body."' 0 5 This
distinction between the required degree of specificity, more for states than the
federal government, is supported both by considerations of federalism, which Justice
O'Connor emphasizes were altered by the Civil War Amendments, and by the notion
of separation of powers. Supreme Court deference to the factual findings of
Congress is one thing; Supreme Court deference to the Richmond City Council is
quite another.
Once again, by splitting some very thin hairs, Justice O'Connor staked out a
ground that was too narrow for three of her concurring colleagues -- Justices
Kennedy, 6 Stevens,0 7 and Scalia.' This failure to deal decisively with Fullilove
would come back and haunt Justice O'Connor in Metro Broadcasting.
Next, Justice O'Connor defended again the strict scrutiny approach to equal
protection issues involving race, regardless of who is benefited or burdened by the
classification scheme. Here, Justice O'Connor is at her finest, speaking with clarity
and moral conviction.
In defending what is sometimes referred to as the "colorblind" theory of equal
protection,109 she emphasized that fourteenth amendment rights attach to the individ-
05 Id. at 719 (emphasis added) (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 515-16 n. 14). The unitalicized portion of the
quote is still troublesome, in that it suggests that some form of affirmative action could be regarded as a
remedy for prior equal protection violations when enacted by the federal government, but an equal protection
violation in its own right when enacted by state governments. That is, since state power is limited only by
the constitutional constraints, to the extent that federal power is substantively "broader" this necessarily
means that it empowers the Congress to violate the Constitution -- an extraordinary internal inconsistency
that Justice Powell surely did not intent to read into the document.
106 Justice Kennedy stated that obvious but easily overcome objection to the reconciliation of Fullilove and
City ofRichmondupon federal versus state lines. However, his real basis for refusing to join Justice O'Connor
was that the issue was not before them. Apparently, he was willing to leave Fullilove to dangle in the wind,
pending a proper opportunity to overrule it.
I07 Justice Stevens dissented in Fullilove, and he was apparently still not willing to concede the correctness
of the result, as Justice O'Connor position implicitly does.
101 Justice Scalia found it fruitless attempt to "derive a rationale" from the three separate opinions supporting
the judgment in Fullilove, none of which commanded more than three votes. Id. at 736. Nevertheless, he
accepted the distinction between state and federal race-conscious relief, and predicated it not only on the Civil
War Amendments, "but also upon social reality and governmental theory," id., namely that in addressing
the need to remedy prior discrimination, the federal government is more likely to be flexible and objective
than are state and local governments.
19 Theterm derives from the dissentof the first Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,559(1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), where he rejected "separate but equal" as a viable constitutional doctrine. His
position was ultimately vindicated in Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 4RI (I Q') , 1heit on the bss
of sociological considerations rather than moral or constitutional principles.
The "colorblind" theory of constitutional law is, of course, a great stumbling block to the proponents
of affumative action, who dismiss it as a "myth" and a "slogan" and exercise great ingenuity in attempting
to prove that it does not really mean what it says. See Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT.
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ual," thus making membership in any particular racial group irrelevant to the
quantum of an individual's right of equal treatment. Quoting from Justice Powell's
decision in Bakke, she reaffirmed that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to
a person of another color.
Next, she pointed out that allegedly benign but non-remedial racial classifica-
tions carry a danger of stigmatic harm, in that "they may in fact promote notions of
racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility." 11 2 Strict scrutiny is thus
necessary, she said, to distinguish racial preferences that are truly remedial from
those that are not.
She also stated that while racial classifications may be allowed to serve short-
term remedial goals, the "ultimate goal" is to eliminate "entirely from governmen-
tal decision making such irrelevant factors as a human being's race,"" 3 and that
strict scrutiny is necessary in order to make that a reality. Agreeing with Justice
Powell's observation in Bakke that the mere desire to have more Black medical
students and doctors was nothing more than "discrimination for its own sake,"' 4
she likewise implicitly rejected the notion that there is something intrinsically good
about proportionate racial and sexual representation in all aspects of American life,
which is the unstated premise of most non-remedial affirmative action plans --
including the one that she approved in Johnson.
And finally, though she deals with it gingerly, she recognized that the City of
Richmond's seemingly high-minded affirmative action on behalf of powerless
minorities may have actually been nothing more than the raw exercise of political
power by the dominant racial group." 5 Thus, whatever justification there might be
for applying a relaxed standard to decisions by a racial majority to enact classifica-
tion which disadvantage itself, she said those justification were inapposite here.
REV. 99; Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Colorblind?, 20 J. MAR. L. REv. 201
(1986). See also, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (referring to it as a term of "aspiration rather than a description of reality"); id. at 401
(Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Like any figure of speech, it cannot be taken literally
or applied mechanically to every situation. The phrase does, however, reflect a core value of our civil society
and a heavy burden of justification should lie on those who would violate it with color-conscioius decisions.
110 City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 721 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (" [R]ights created
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms guaranteed to the individual. The rights
established are personal rights.")).
I Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90).
112Id.
I1 d. at 722 (quoting Justice Stevens' dissent in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 320).
Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
5 Id. She notes that Blacks comprise approximately 50% of the population of Richmond and hold five of
the nine seats on the city council. See also, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 541-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that the federal set-aside program was regarded by the "Black caucus" as simply a form of political
patronage that the "constituents were entitled to").
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In sum, although all of what Justice O'Connor said here was in the context of
justifying the strict scrutiny test, her comments are also germane to the question of
which racial classifications can ever satisfy that test. The implications of this are far
more significant than the Court's intramural quarrel over the proper test to use.
In any event, Justice Kennedy joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
White in this portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion, and since Justice Scalia likewise
agreed that strict scrutiny was the appropriate test, 116 this established for the first time
a majority on the standard of review issue.
The question before her was thus narrowed to this: Did the City of Richmond
have strong basis for believing that remedial action was appropriate (i.e. that it or its
prime contractors had previously discriminated against minority contractors and
sub- contractors) and if so was the minority set-aside program narrowly framed to
serve that remedial purpose?
In Parts III.B and IV, which had majority support, Justice O'Connor pro-
ceeded to show that the City Council had relied on little more than generalized
assertions of past discrimination and had not even considered the use of race-neutral
means for increasing minority business participation in city contracting. The details
of that factual analysis, and of Justice Marshall's careful rebuttal need not concern
us."17 What is significant is the fact that Justice O'Connor still implicitly accepts the
proposition that prior discrimination against one member of the minority class can
justify later "remedial" discrimination in favor of another member of the minority
class."'18 Her disagreement with Justice Marshall was simply over the sufficiency of
the proof of the prior discrimination.
In contrast, Justice Scalia circumvented that whole factual controversy by
rejecting the underlying premise. In essence, his point was that affirmative
"6 City ofRichmond, 109S. Ct. at 735. Rather than debate over which standard of review to use in affinrative
action cases, Justice Stevens went off on an idiosyncratic evaluation of the disparate treatment by reference
to "characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged classes." Id. at 732. Seeing that tile advantaged
was not limited to prior victims and that the disadvantaged class was not limited to perpetrators. fie concluded
that the classification was based on purely stereotypical thinking that a hallmark of equal protection
violations.
I 7 In Part V of her opinion, Justice O'Connor states in positive terms what a city might do in response to the
problem of prime contractor discrimination against minority subcontractors. Apparently, neither Justice
Scalia nor Justice Stevens was willing to join her in this gratuitous legal advice.
"I The logical converse is that discrimination by one member of the non-minority class will justify later
reverse discrimination against another member of the non-minority class. In Fullilove, Chief Justice Burger
had justified reverse discrimination against non-perpetrators in just those terms. He said that "in the past
some non-minority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the virtual exclusion
of minority firms from these contracting opportunities." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added) T urspi
O'Connor's requirement that the "factual predicate- of prior discrimination relate to the affirmative action
actor (or those for which it might be indirectly responsible, e.g., discriminating contractors) implicitly rejects
that proposition. However, by being perpetrator-specific but not victim-specific, Justice O'Connor's
approach seems to be more punitive than remedial.
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discrimination could never be regarded as truly remedial unless it was in favor of the
original victim -- which was clearly not the objective of the Richmond set-aside
program. Justice O'Connor, however, was apparently not yet willing to accept that
proposition,"19 and chose instead to resolve the case on the narrower grounds of the
lack of a factual predicate showing specific discrimination against anybody.
Martin v. Wilks: 120
JUSTICE O'CONNOR
MUTE
This is the only affirmative action case in which Justice O'Connor did not
write an opinion of some kind. It is also the only affirmative action case ever to have
only a majority and a dissenting opinion.'2 Justice O'Connor was content to simply
join the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
The case involved the question of whether a voluntary consent decree between
a group of minority plaintiffs and a public employer could provide a defense to the
employer in a reverse discrimination case brought later by a group of non-minority
plaintiffs. The majority held that the doctrine of "impermissible collateral attack"
did not immunize parties to a consent decree from charges of discrimination by
nonparties for actions taken pursuant to the decree.
The Martin case was a significant defeat for the proponents forces of
affirmative action; another nail in the coffin. Yet the decision was actually argued
and decided on rather technical procedural grounds. Even the dissent, probably
because it was written by Justice Stevens rather than one of the liberal troika, was
devoid of the usual polemics. Thus, little can be said about Justice O'Connor's
"silent concurrence" with the result. Certainly, it puts a limiting gloss on her Stotts
emphasis of the finality of consent degrees, On the other hand, it is entirely
consistent with her Firefighters view that consent decrees are more like voluntary
affirmative action plans than they are injunctions and that the reverse discrimination
resulting from them is as subject to challenge by a nonparty as was the affirmative
action plan in Weber.2 '
"9 On the other hand, she did regard as less "problematic" a set-aside program, like the one in Fullilove,
which at least made provision for limiting the entitlement to minority businesses who could show that they
were in fact still suffering from "the effects.of past discrimination by the city or prime contractors." City
ofRichmond, 109 S. Ct. at 729. Thus, "actual victim" status seems to be an important consideration to Justice
O'Connor, but not yet a controlling one.
120 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
121 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia,
and Kennedy. Justice Stevens filed the dissenting opinion, which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
joined.
'12 More interesting in this regard would be a comparison of Chief Justice Rehnquist's position in this case
with his dissent in Firefighters.
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Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC:123
TRULY, A HOUSE DIVIDED
This case involved the constitutionality of a Federal Communication Com-
mission policy of treating minority ownership and participation in management as
a "plus factor" when granting licenses for new radio or television broadcast
stations. Its companion case, Astroline Communications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcast-
ing of Hartford, involved the constitutionality of an FCC "distress sale" policy of
allowing a broadcaster whose qualifications to hold a license have come into
question to transfer that license before an FCC hearing on the matter, but only if the
transfer is to a qualified minority enterprise. In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of both policies.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court, his last, is a tedious compendium of
legislative history, social science studies, and self-serving FCC opinions and policy
statements establishing that diversity of broadcast viewpoint is in the public interest
and that the race of ethnic grouping of a broadcaster is a generally reliable
determinant of the viewpoints of that broadcaster.
Having drunk deeply from the muddy waters of broadcast demographics and
the sociology of race and culture, Justice Brennan then turned to the constitutional
issue. The obstacle he had to overcome was the J.A. Croson case, where a majority
of the Court held that even remedial or "benign" racial classifications were subject
to strict scrutiny. Sensing that it would be difficult if not impossible for these policies
to satisfy that test, Justice Brennan staged a brilliant maneuver. He simply recruited
Justice White from the camp of the Croson strict scrutinizers, and the affirmative
action "funeral procession" suddenly became a celebration.
Drawing then on the uncertain Fullilove/Croson distinction between federal
and state reverse discrimination, Justice Brennan concluded that state action in this
regard is subject to strict scrutiny while federal action, even when it is predicated on
the commerce clause rather than section 5 of the 14th amendment, is entitled to a
higher level of deference. "We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated
by Congress . . . are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve
important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives." 1 24 Although Justice O'Connor
argued that the FCC policies could not even satisfy that intermediate level of
scrutiny, Justice Brennan's notion of what the test required was considerably more
relaxed.
121- 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). This case was heard together with Astroline Communications Co. v. Sherberg
Broadcasting of Harford, Inc.
124 Id. at 3008-09.
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Justice Stevans, jubilant that the Court had finally endorsed his non-remedial
"future benefits" theory of affirmative action, filed a short concurring opinion.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a trenchant dissent which
compared the majority's allegedly "benign" racist mentality with that of the long-
sinse repudiated "separate but equal" philosophy of Plessy v. Ferguson'25 and with
the current apartheid policies of South Africa. 2 6 Displaying a delightful aphoristic
ability, Justice Kennedy concluded by expressing regret that "after a century of
judicial opinions we interpret the Constitution to do no more than move us from
'separate but equal' to 'unequal but benign." 1 27
It was left to Justice O'Connor, however, to write the principal dissent, in
which she was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Kennedy.
Although it is a lengthy opinion, the salient points are easy to summarize. She repeats
the points she made in Croson, namely that the Court should apply the same strict
standard of scrutiny to evaluate all racial classifications -- whether they are imposed
by the federal or state government. 28  She then shows that the FCC policies in
question do not pass that test. She strongly intimates that remedying prior
discrimination is probably the only governmental interest that would be "compel-
ling" enough to ever warrant racial classifications; 129 and even if the classification
is not thusly limited, increasing diversity of broadcast viewpoints would not qualify
as "compelling" in any event. And even if it did, the use of race or ethnicity as a
proxy for diversity of viewpoint does not reflect a narrow tailoring of the means to
the desired end. This is because there are other alternatives available for achieving
the desired diversity and because the alternative chosen by the FCC imposes an
undue burden on those who do not happen to be members of the favored racial or
ethnic groups. 30
125 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
126 Justice Brennan apparently took great umbrage at this on the grounds that these examples were hardly of
"benign" discrimination, while the FCC policies were. 110 S.Ct. at 3008 n. 12. The distinction between
"benign" and "malicious" racial discrimination is not the point, however. The point is that both flow from
the exact same rootstock idea that race is somehow a relevant, indeed important, determinant of human
entitlement.
17 110 S. Ct. at 3047 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
128 Justice O'Connor's explication of the Fullilove/Croson federal/state distinction continues to be somewhat
uncertain. She again asserted, as she had in Croson, that Fullilove involved the exercise by Congress of its
unique remedial power under section 5 of the 14th amendment to remedy identified past discrimination. 110
S. Ct. at 3030. Apparently, her point is that while the Equal Protection standard of review remains the same,
i.e., strict scrutiny, it is easier for Congress to satisfy the test than it is for state and local governments. More
telling is her point that the test Justice Brennan now reads into Fullilove is virtually identical to the test
proffered there by Justice Marshall, but rejected by the majority. Id. at 3032.
"I She had left this possibility open in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 n.*. Now, however, she unequivocally states
that "modern equal protection doctrine has recognized only one such [compelling] interest: remedying the
effects of racial discrimination." 110 S. Ct. at 3034.
130 Justice O'Connor gives short shrift to the argument that nonminorities were not unduly burdened because
race and ethnicity were only regarded as a "plus factor." She shows that it is of little consolation to a
discriminated-against applicant to learn that race was only "a factor" in the decision, when that factor turns
out to be the dispositive one. 110 S. Ct. at 3043. This should be compared with her highly questionable
analysis of the "plus factor" concept in Johnson. See text at notes 92-94, supra.
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Justice O'Connor's argumentation of each of these points is meticulous, and
she ultimately demonstrates that while the majority verbalizes an intermediate
standard of review, in actuality it is applying little more than the toothless "rational
relationship" test previously used only for evaluating economic regulations.' 3 '
The previous description of Justice Brennan's points, and Justice O'Connor's
counterpoints is, however, enormously superficial. Yet, most of the Supreme Court
debate has been superficial. Certain fundamental premises were always implicit in
the opinions, but they were only implicit. However, in Metro Broadcasting --
although they are sometimes still buried "between the lines" and otherwise
scattered among the discussion of the proper test and other detritus of constitutional
jurisprudence -- the more fundamental premises of the Justices are finally becoming
evident.'32 And they confirm the obvious, namely that on affirmative action the
Supreme Court is now deeply and irreconcilably divided.
The division occurs over two distinct but closely affiliated points. The first
relates to the relative importance of race and ethnicity in defining our "identity" as
human beings. The second relates to whether humans are to be viewed primarily as
individuals or merely as fungible components of a larger group, which in the
affirmative action context would be determined by race or ethnic background.
Justice Brennan's contingency apparently believes that race and ethnicity not
only do play a major role in defining who we are, thus influencing our perceptions
and opinions over a broad spectrum of issues;'33 he also apparently believes that this
is desirable. There are and should be distinct "Black," "Arab," "Hispanic," etc.
interests, viewpoints, and cultural preferences. The object, thts, is not to integrate
these racial and ethnic groups into a larger national community; the object, rather,
is to insure that each group receives its "fair share" of the nation's social, economic,
and political benefits. '34
In Justice Brennan's view, race and ethnicity are not only important. In
addition, when dealing with them the focus should be on the racial or ethnic group
itself. He readily admits that the notion of a "Black" or "Hispanic viewpoint"
31 110 S. Ct. at 3029; see also, id. at 3041 ("The Court's lengthy discussion of this issue [the nexus between
means and ends] . . .purports to establish only that some relation exists between owners' race and
programming: i.e., that the FCC' s choice to focus on allocation of licenses is rationally related to the asserted
ends") (emphasis added).
"I The fundamental premises are more evident in the opinions of Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy than
they are in the opinion of Justice Brennan. Indeed, Justice Kennedy takes Justice Brennan to task for this
apparent unwillingness to even deal with the implicit premises of his position. 110 S. Ct. at 3044-47
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
is ,,pinion is libc liay sprinkled with references to materiais which aiiegedly prove this.
'3 His reliance on some of the voting rights cases are particularly telling in this regard. He notes that many
of these cases "operate on the assumption that minorities have particular viewpoints and interests worthy of
protection" and that a state may 'deliberately creat[e] or preserv[e] black majorities in particular districts
.... "' 110S. Ct. at 3019.
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involves a generalization and that not every member of the class will always share
the same viewpoint. 135 But since he believes the generalization is inductively valid
(i.e. "on the whole" and "in the aggregate" most members of a racial grouping will
share common interests and viewpoints), 3 6 the focus is properly on the group. It is
thus of no consequence to him that a particular beneficiary of the FCC's policy of
racial preference might not happen to fall within the stereotype. It is a benefit that
flows to the racial group, and how it is distributed within that group is not important.
He likewise evaluates the impact of the "distress sale" policy by focusing on the
burden that it has on nonminorities as a group, and concludes that the burden is slight
since there have been only a relatively few number of such sales. 37 The burden on
the specific nonminority who has disqualified from participating in particular sale
is simply of no consequence it him.
The upshot of these two points of view is that the individual is important only
because of his or her membership in a particular racial or ethnic group; and the proper
state of affairs will exist only when the racial and ethnic composition of every sub-
unit of society mirrors the racial and ethnic composition of society as a whole. And
since this is not going to occur naturally, the "social engineers" of government must
establish and then maintain, forever, the correct proportion. 13
Given Justice Brennan's premises, one can hardly be surprised that he would
look with favor upon the two FCC policies. And since the two policies were thus
consistent with his world view, their constitutionality was easily assured. Every-
thing else was mere afterthought and formal justification.
Justice O'Connor and her allies, on the other hand, proceed from an entirely
different set of premises. They apparently believe that race and ethnicity are among
the least important of human characteristics -- probably from a social and certainly
from a constitutional perspective. A person's identity as a person, rather, is
measured by that person's morals, intellect, diligence, and achievements, not from
the fortuity of race or ancestry. Justice O'Connor believes that little good can ever
come out of a preoccupation with racial and ethnic differences, and that the
Balkanization of the nation along those lines'39 is bound to produce tension, hostility,
and conflict."n
3
' Id. at 3018.
136 Justice Brennan's theory, apparently, that it is permissible to act upon generalizations that are based on
valid imperical data and "analysis," 110 S. Ct. at 3017-18, and that it becomes "impermissible stereotyp-
ing," 110 S. Ct. at 3018, only when it is the result of unreasoned habits and reactions. For a discussion of
the dangers of this kind of reasoning, see note 142, infra.
137 110 S. Ct. at 3027.
13 Although Justice Brennan contends otherwise, there is no natural end to this kind of discrimination.
Accord, Thernstrom, The Odd Evolution of the Voting Rights Act, 55 PuB. INTERST 49, 76 (1979).
("Proportionality is a destination we shall never reach. We shall always be arriving and never there.")
139 Justice O'Connor viewed the diversity justification as little more than a smoke screen for "proportional
representation of various races" and "outright racial balancing." 110 S. Ct. at 3035.
1401d. at 3029:
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To her, thus, "'benign racial classification' is a contradiction in terms." 4' It
dehumanizes, stigmatizes, and limits even its alleged beneficiaries. In Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan she found that women did not benefit from the
perpetuation of the stereotype that nursing was a "suitable" profession from them.
The caricature of a "Black broadcaster," on which the FCC policies were apparently
based, similarly consigns each individual entrepreneur of that race to a preconceived
and narrowly defined role in the broadcasting industry. The "benign" label is also
self-contradictory, in Justice O'Connor's view, because the use of racial classifica-
tions always disadvantages someone of the race not being favored, even if other
opportunities are available to this person. "[I]t is no response to a person denied
admission at one school, or discharged from one job, solely on the basis of race, that
other schools or employers do not discriminate" 142 or, she might have added, that
many other nonminority persons were not disadvantaged on that basis.
Justice O'Connor's almost blanket rejection of race and ethnicity as a relevant
determinant is simply part and parcel of her broader view that persons should be
evaluated by reference to what they are as individuals rather than by reference to their
membership in an especially favored or disfavored class. The basic unit for moral
and legal analysis is not the group, with its members merely being regarded as
fungible components; in her view, rather, the basic unit is the individual, with groups
being a mere byproduct of choice or chance. 4 3 Thus, even if it is generally true that
Blacks as a class tend to enjoy Rap or Reggae music more than whites do, or have
a higher incident of arrest and conviction per thousand,'" Justice O'Connor would
The dangers of such classifications are clear. They endorse race-based reasoning and the
conception of a National divided into racial blocks, thus contributing to an escalation of racial
hostility and conflict.... Such policies may embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the
product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts -- their very worth as citizens --
according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the Constitution.... Racial
classifications, whether providing benefits to or burdening particular racial or ethnic groups,
may stigmatize those groups singled out for different treatment and may create considerable
tension with the Nation's widely shared commitment to evaluating individuals upon their
individual merit.
,41 Id. at 3032.
142 Id. at 3043. The quotation is loaded with significance. In his opinion, Justice Brennan had relied on, and
thus reaffirmed, Justice Powell's theory in Bakke that racial diversity among students serves as ajustification
for racially discriminatory admissions policies. 110 S. Ct. at 3017. Justice O'Connor, of course, rejected the
diversity theory in the context of broadcast licenses, and this quotation suggests that she now might be of the
view that Bakke was also wrongly decided.
43 She notes that "we are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities
knitted together by various traditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals." 110 S.Ct. at 3033
(emphasis added).
'4 See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), affd with modifications,
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (arrest records); Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir.
1975) (conviction records). These cases arose under the Title VII "disparate impact" theory of discrimi-
nation, first articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). That theory is likewise predicated
on a ccept of "' o,u wrongs- and is j .. e same objeciluns s affirmative action. See REPoRT
To THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REDEFINING DISCIMINATION: DisPARATE IMPAcr AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF AFFIRMATIVE AcnoN 20-30 (1987). The sad irony is that in establishing a disparate impact violation
minority plaintiffs are often required to present statistical evidence that, in essence, confirms the validity of
what would otherwise merely be regarded as the prejudiced and stereotypical viewpoint of the bigot. Justice
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apparently not be willing to deal with a particular member of that class merely on the
basis of that assumption. "' If achieving diversity of broadcast viewpoints is thus the
goal, then she would identify diversity on an individual basis, not by reference to
some racial or ethnic proxy. 1
46
Justice O'Connor's world view of race/ethnicity and individual's/groups is far
more consistent with constitutional principle than is Justice Brennan's. The opening
lines of her dissent state with crystal clarity:
At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies
the simple command that the Government must treat citizens "as
individuals, not 'as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or
national class."' ... Social scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts
and behavior reflect their background, but the Constitution provides
that the Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among
individuals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines
how they act or think.147
In sum, Metro Broadcasting reveals a fundamental difference in how the
members of the Court think. Justice Brennan thinks in terms of racial and ethnic
groupings, and of insuring that a proportionately equal share of society's goods go
to each of these groups. From this perspective, almost any form of affirmative action
will be attractive. Justice O'Connor thinks in terms of individuals whose identifying
characteristics relate to each individual's unique merit and worth, and of insuring
that government does not allocate its benefits on any other basis, particularly on the
basis of race. From this perspective, no form of affirmative action, as the term is
currently understood, can be deemed acceptible.
Those two views sharply divide the Court. And the disagreement will not be
resolved through arguments over the proper level of scrutiny, the distinction between
state and federal action, the significance of obscure precedents, or the existence of
Brennan's distinguishment of "good" stereotypes from "bad," depending on whether they are valid or not,
110 S.Ct. at 3018, thus carries with it some very dangerous implications.
1415 In Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985), the Court indicated that if a generalization about
age was true but not universally so (i.e. the employer could not show that all or substantially all persons of
that age lacked the requisite qualifications), then age could not be used as a proxy unless the employer could
show that an individual determination was impossible or impractical. In sum, even if a generalization is valid,
it is not rational (or fair) to act on it, vis-a-vis any specific class member, without first attempting to confirm
the truth of the generality with respect to that class member.
' Justice O'Connor stated:
The policy is overinclusive: many members of a particular racial or ethnic group will have
no interest in advancing the views the FCC believes to be underrepresented, or will find them
utterly foreign. The policy is underinclusive: it awards no preference to disfavored
individuals who may be particularly well versed in and committed to presenting those views.
110 S. Ct. at 3039.
147 110 S.Ct. at 3028.
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necessary factual predicates. At this point, a change in the composition of the Court
is the only way a consistent resolution of the affirmative action issue is going to be
achieved. Justice Brennan's retirement, and Justice Souter's appointment as his
replacement, represent a significant step in that direction.
Justice O'Connor v. Justice O'Connor:
THE CONFLICT RESOLVED
Like the Supreme Court itself, over the last ten years Justice O'Connor has
often been at war with herself over affirmative action. She began by attempting to
resolve the conflict on an essentially ad hoc basis. It was not a successful approach. 148
It is virtually impossible to synthesize her early decisions into a coherent theory of
affirmative action. They were too contextually oriented and fact-specific to be of
much use in predicting how other affirmative action cases should be resolved. Thus,
even if a majority of the Court had joined in some of her "narrow" opinions, their
value as precedent would be limited and uncertain. 49
The fundamental issue that Justice O'Connor was striving so hard to avoid was
whether a govemmental unit, limited by the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
or a private employer, limited by the non-discrimination mandate of Title VII, could
ever afford racially preferential treatment to anyone other than a specifically
identified victim of that unit's or that employer's own prior discrimination. She
probably avoided the issue because she realized that if public and private conduct
were limited in that fashion, it would mean an absolute end to "affirmative action"
as it is currently understood and practiced -- a seemingly radical position that she was
apparently reluctant to take.
Although she still avoided that ultimate issue in Croson, her opinion in that
case and in Metro Broadcasting each reflect a growing willingness to approach the
affirmative action issue on a broader and more principled basis. At the constitutional
level, she has thus become virtually absolute in her opposition. Indeed, in Metro
Broadcasting she even implicitly resolved the specific issue she had so long avoided.
In characterizing Fullilove, she said that "the Court upheld the challenged set-aside
only because it contained a waiver provision that ensured that the program served its
'" But see, Daly, Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors -- Keeping Score in the Affirmative Action Ballpark
From Weber to Johnson, 30 B.C.L. REV. 1, 78 (1988): "That she has not been entirely successful does not
undermine her prospects of success in the future. The nonaligned character of her jurisprudence makes her
an ideal 'play-maker' for the next nine innings."
'49 Her affirmative action decisions are not alone in being subject to this criticism. "She often leaves lower
court judges guessing at how the next case should be resolved. In one recent case, for .xap!e, twe Reag -
appointed judges and a Carter-appointed judge needed to decide a dispute over attorneys' fees based on a
precedent in which O'Connor's lone concurrence had tipped the balance. 'Her word is the law of the land,
but we just didn't know what to make of it,' one of the judges recalls. 'She left the issues very, very
unsettled."' Taylor, Swing Vote on the Constitution, AM. LAW., June 1989, at 74.
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remedial function in particular cases." 150 On the other hand, she also indicated that
"the FCC or Congress may yet conclude after suitable examination that narrowly
tailored race-conscious measures are required to remedy discrimination that may be
identified in the allocation of broadcast licenses," 5 1 without any suggestion that this
preferential treatment would have to be limited to proven victims of the FCC's prior
discrimination.
Although she still evidences some ambivalence on the issue, if it is again
squarely presented to her, Justice O'Connor is very likely to resolve it in favor of
limiting affirmative action to this form of victim-specific relief, both as a matter of
statutory and constitutional law.
The analysis on which this conclusion is based begins with her premise that
race conscious affirmative relief is appropriate, under both the equal protection
clause and Title VII, primarily if not exclusively as a "remedy" for prior discrimi-
nation. While she would probably recognize that some non-remedial race conscious
decisions might be appropriate in unusual and extraordinary circumstances (such as
where the police need a Black police officer to infiltrate a Black drug gang), she has
expressly rejected all the other more commonly asserted justifications -- promoting
diversity (in broadcasting, and probably in education as well),5 2 providing role
models, and simply achieving what is regarded as the "proper" racial mix.
Next, there is her recognition that the "remedy" theory of justification
necessarily assumes the existence of a "violation," and a great deal of her
jurisprudence is devoted to the question of how the existence of this "violation" can
be established for remedial affirmative action purposes. The existence of a
"violation," however, also assumes a "perpetrator." With respect to this facet of
the theory, she has repeatedly indicated that an affirmative action actor is privileged
to "remedy" only the prior discrimination of that actor, or someone for whom the
actor is responsible, but not the prior discrimination of society as a whole. Finally,
the notion of a "violation" necessarily implies the existence of a "victim," and the
notion of a "remedy" necessarily implies a "beneficiary" of that remedy. Justice
O'Connor has not yet adequately addressed the" victim/beneficiary" aspects of her
theory -- in either the constitutional or the statutory context.
There is, of course, the dictum in Metro Broadcasting which suggests that the
minority set-aside in Fullilove was sustained only because there was a provision in
the statute which would limit the beneficiaries of the preference to those who had
previously been victimized by the discrimination. The broader aspects of her Croson
150 110 S.Ct. at 3039 (emphasis added).
I' ld. at 3033.
"'
2In Metro Broadcasting, however, Justice Brennan pointedly reminded Justice O'Connor of her admission
in Wygant that racial diversity and possibility other governmental interests might be sufficient to justify race-
conscious governmental action. 110 S.Ct. at 3010-11 n. 15.
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and Metro Broadcasting opinions resolve the issue even more conclusively, how-
ever.
The notion of non-victim specific "remedial" affirmative action makes sense
only if you assume that the original wrong was against "the group" and that the later
remedy is for "the group's" benefit.153 Under that view it thus does not make any
difference that the original victim was MI and the current beneficiary is M2. That is
how Justice Brennan would view it.'54 Justice O'Connor, however, is not of that
school. In Croson she emphasized that rights attach to individuals, not groups, and
in Metro Broadcasting she repeatedly reaffirmed that and, indeed, rejected the whole
conceptual framework on which the theory of group rights/wrongs is based. Under
her view, the proper focus of analysis is on the individual as an individual, not as
some fungible component of a group. It is thus inconceivable that Justice O'Connor
would now ever concede the legitimacy of anything but victim-specific remedial
affirmative action.
This conclusion, moreover, is generally consistent with Justice O'Connor's
earlier, more technical affirmative action jurisprudence -- modified somewhat and
then carried to its logical conclusion. The first step in the reformulation of Justice
O'Connor's approach begins with the Teamsters case, around which much of her
affirmative action analysis is based. She already uses the Teamsters prima facie case
-- namely, evidence of a statistical disparity, which raises an inference of discrimi-
nation that has not yet been challenged by other statistics or alternative explanations
-- as the "factual predicate" for the existence of some kind of affirmative action.
The next two steps in the suggested analysis merely build on this Teamsters analogy.
That is, if the affirmative action occurs in the form of hiring, promoting, or otherwise
favoring a particular minority employee over non-minority employees, then the
action must be able to survive two challenges.
First, as under the Teamsters analysis, if the non-minority employees can
show that the statistical disparity is a result of societal rather than the employer's
discrimination, then there is no legal justification for any kind of minority preferen-
tial treatment that disadvantages non-minorities. This is simply fuses together the
rebuttal portion of the Teamsters approach to liability with her Wygant rejection of
"societal discrimination" as a justification for affirmative action.
Second, even if the inference of employer discrimination survives the chal-
lenge, thus justifying remedial preferences with respect to who gets hired or
promoted, the Teamster's analogy suggests that this merely moves the enquiry to a
higher level of specificity. Since Justice O'Connor subscribes to the idea that
See Gragiia, supra note 76, at 592.
Justice Blackmun's philosophy of affirmative action is similarly predicated on the notion that it operates
as a remedy that "is provided to the class as a whole rather than individual members." Stotts, 467 U.S. at
613 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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constitutional and statutory rights attach to individuals as individuals rather than as
members of a particular sex, race, or ethnic group, and that remedies are similarly
oriented, it would thus be reasonable for her to also utilize, by analogy, the second
stage of the Teamsters analysis. In a Teamsters case, once a violation is established
through the use of statistical evidence, then the plaintiffs must show that each
particular claimant for a job applied or would have applied but for the employer's
discrimination, and therefore was a "potential victim of the proved discrimina-
tion.' ' 55 This shifts the burden onto the employer to disprove the victim status of
particular plaintiffs, by showing that they would not have been hired anyway, for
nondiscriminatory reasons.
It would be consistent with Justice O'Connor's premises for a similar
approach to be taken in the affirmative action context. The beneficiaries of
affirmative action, or the defendant employer on their behalf, should be required to
make some showing that they were likely or probable victims of the prior discrimi-
nation, as evidenced by the statistics. 156 The proof of this perhaps need not be as
rigorous as it would be in a true Teamsters or Stotts context, thus maintaining the
viability of Justice O'Connor's Firefighters thesis that voluntary affirmative action
should be evaluated by a somewhat more tolerant standard than that used for court-
ordered affirmative action. But the distinction between voluntary and court-ordered
affirmative action is not so great as to dispense altogether with the need for employer
justification for preferring one particular minority employee over non-minority
employees. That justification must be "probable victim status," for to afford
preferential treatment to minorities who were not even remotely within range of the
prior discrimination is totally inconsistent with Justice O'Connor's theory that
affirmative discrimination can be justified only for "remedial" purposes.
This approach is the logical extension of certain important strands in the
affirmative action cloth of Justice O'Connor, and its ultimate adoption will require
only a minor unraveling of her prior handiwork. Her admission in Paradise that
preferential treatment of nonvictims might be appropriate when "truly" or "mani-
festly" necessary and used "sparingly"'5 7 can be dismissed as dicta. She will also
have to agree to overrule Weber, which she was not willing to do in Johnson because
"that question was not raised, briefed, or argued in this Court or in the courts
below.' '1 58 In an appropriate case, given the utter speciousness of the Weber
decision, 15 9 it is not unlikely that she would follow Justice Scalia's lead in repudiat-
431 U.S. at 362.
'5 In all probability, if the employer could make that showing, this would be conclusive of the entitlement
issue. Once probable victim status is established, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs in an affirmative action case
would be able to disprove that on an individual basis. The second part of the Teamsters remedy proof would
thus pass out of the picture.
'57 480 U.S. at 197.
5 480 U.S. at 648.
09 See, e.g., Walker, The Exorbitant Cost of redistributing Injustice: United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 51 B.C.L. REV. 1 (1979).
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ing it. With Weber out of the way, her disappointing analysis in Johnson, which was
clearly based on Weber as its precedent, would become of historical interest only. It
would in no way limit the complete development of her Teamsters analogy for
affirmative action.
CONCLUSION
However valid the characterizations might have been at some point in time,
Justice O'Connor is currently neither a mugwump, a mediator, nor a Machiavellian.
All three images were the result of a narrow, hesitant, often compromising approach
that she has since abandoned. Her opinions in Croson and Metro Broadcasting,
rather, are now firmly based on fundamental principles of constitutional law, which
she applies logically, rigorously, and without equivocation. When you cut through
all the legal technicalities and details, her position is simple and clear. Whether
benign or maligant, decisions about a person that are based on that person's race and
ethnicity are contrary to the letter and spirit of American law. One can only hope that
at some time if the future that is all she will need to say, in an opinion that speaks,
not just for a majority, but for an entire Court of like-minded justices.
Dr. Martin Luther King once said, "I have a dream that my four little children
will one day live in a Nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skins,
but by the conduct of their character." 160 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has not lost
sight of that dream.
160 A TREAsuRE OF THE WORLD'S GREAT SPEECHES 839 (H. Peterson, ed. 1965).
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